NYT Essay Blaming Miles for Spirit's Collapse Draws Sharp Rebuttal

A New York Times essay arguing that airline miles helped kill Spirit Airlines is facing pointed pushback from aviation writers who say the piece ignores that Spirit used the same financing playbook it claims sank the carrier. The essay's author, Mark Kahan, is a former Spirit executive who left the airline in September 2006 — before Spirit adopted the ultra-low-cost model that later defined it, according to View from the Wing. Kahan's central claim is that co-branded credit card deals let American, Delta and United borrow billions against their loyalty programs, entrenching an advantage Spirit couldn't match.

Both View from the Wing and Live and Let's Fly acknowledge part of that premise has merit: the big three carriers' loyalty programs are worth enormous sums, banks pay billions annually for miles distributed through co-branded cards, and those cash flows helped major airlines secure financing through the pandemic. But both outlets say Kahan's leap from "big airlines had bigger loyalty programs" to "miles killed Spirit" doesn't hold up, because Spirit itself borrowed against its Free Spirit loyalty program on more than one occasion.

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Spirit borrowed against its own loyalty program too

According to View from the Wing, Spirit issued $850 million in secured debt in September 2020 backed by cash flows from the Free Spirit credit card, its membership club, associated intellectual property and its brand. Spirit subsidiaries issued another $600 million in November 2022, the report states. After a $340 million repayment in between, outstanding balance stood at $1.11 billion — meaning Spirit tapped roughly $1.45 billion total through the same loyalty-backed financing mechanism the essay describes as effectively closed to the airline, per View from the Wing.

Live and Let's Fly frames the real gap differently: it wasn't that Spirit lacked access to this financing tool, but that Free Spirit's loyalty base was smaller and less valuable to begin with. Delta SkyMiles, United MileagePlus and American AAdvantage carry larger memberships, richer credit card portfolios and international partner redemptions that Free Spirit never offered, the outlet notes. As it summarizes the point from Gary Leff at View from the Wing, "the reward for flying Spirit was more flying on Spirit" — a far less compelling pitch than redeeming United miles for Lufthansa first class or American miles for Qatar Airways business class.

Fuel prices weren't the deciding factor, figures show

Kahan's essay also points to fuel costs tied to the Iran war as a blow that proved fatal to Spirit's restructuring plans. View from the Wing disputes the timeline and the math: Spirit was already in its second bankruptcy when it reported $239 million in operating revenue against $311.7 million in operating expenses for November 2025 — a $72.7 million operating loss and a negative 30.4% operating margin, months before the fuel spike Kahan cites. That month's entire fuel bill was $65.8 million, the report states, meaning even free fuel wouldn't have erased the loss. By December, other airlines were reportedly already bracing for a possible Spirit shutdown, and a further $100 million in financing depended on a pending sale — developments that preceded the jet fuel run-up entirely, according to the report.

The rebuttals leave the essay's core diagnosis in question, arguing Spirit's collapse traces to its low-cost model losing traction against larger rivals rather than to any structural block on loyalty financing. Spirit's bankruptcy proceedings continue, with creditors and potential buyers still sorting out what comes next for the carrier's remaining assets.